The Balloon and the Weather: Why 'Donbas for NATO' Could Not Fly
11/21/26
By:
Michael K.
The week's boldest idea for ending the war was a trade that no one who floated it could deliver

The United States asked Ukraine a question it could not answer: give up Donbas, get NATO. Within a week the idea had produced a trilateral in Shenzhen that never mentioned Ukraine, a Berlin summit that never secured a seat, and a Kremlin that rejected the whole premise. This is the anatomy of a trial balloon.
The question surfaced after the Abu Dhabi round of US-brokered talks on 10–11 November 2026 and was disclosed by Zelenskyy on 13–14 November, days before the first-ever Xi–Trump–Putin trilateral in Shenzhen on 19 November and his Berlin talks with European leaders the same day.
The Donbas-for-NATO idea was never a proposal. It was a trial balloon launched to test red lines, and the week that followed proved the red lines are exactly where everyone said they were: Russia rejects any Ukrainian NATO membership in any form, Ukraine's constitution and referendum law forbid the concession under martial law, and Europe — which would have to ratify, fund and police the outcome — was not even in the room when the question was asked.
What makes the week worth dissecting is that the West's most inventive idea for ending Europe's largest war since 1945 was a territorial swap that no institution involved could actually deliver. The question was asked by actors who cannot grant NATO membership, put to a country whose constitution requires a referendum that its law currently forbids, and answered by a power that has said no to every version of the idea for years.
Three things happened at once, and they are easy to confuse. A question was floated. A summit was staged. And the war and the money kept moving: Russia kept striking Ukraine's grid, a US sanctions waiver let Russian diesel flow to world markets, and Brussels prepared another €45 billion for Kyiv. The real story of the week is not the deal that failed but the architecture that made it impossible.
The Question Nobody Wanted to Answer
The sentence that set the week in motion was a question, not a plan. Volodymyr Zelenskyy told reporters that US negotiators had put it to him directly: "The Americans raised a question: 'What if Ukraine joins NATO? Would Ukraine withdraw from Donbas?'". He said this was the first time the linkage had been raised in the talks, and drew his own conclusion from it: "That is why I believe NATO is back on the agenda. But you have also heard (Russian President Vladimir) Putin's signals, and this is an extremely difficult conversation."
The question arrived at the end of a round that had produced almost nothing else. The two days of US-brokered talks in Abu Dhabi — the first direct US-mediated negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in nine months — concluded without a major breakthrough, though the sides agreed a prisoner exchange involving more than 1,000 people. On territory, the delegations did not move.
What followed the disclosure is as instructive as the disclosure itself. The United States has never confirmed that it made any such offer. A US official told the BBC that "many ideas continue to be discussed but any final deal will have to be agreed to by both parties". Hours after Zelenskyy spoke, Jared Kushner moved to dampen the story, urging "confidentiality" in a sensitive process and noting that "maximalist" proposals had been reported out of the negotiations alongside "strong political rhetoric".
That is the first thing to hold on to: what exists is a question attributed to US negotiators by the Ukrainian president, not a published American plan. The distinction matters because the story travelled faster than its evidence. Zelenskyy's remarks, released by his office, are the single origin of the account; the outlets that carried it amplified one source rather than independently confirming it. Amplification is not corroboration.
The second thing to hold on to is that even taken at face value, the offer was never Washington's to make. Former US Ambassador to Ukraine William Taylor put the constraint plainly: "Bringing a new country into the NATO alliance requires the unanimous consent of all other member states." That is why the idea was described from the outset as not a firm offer — a promise that every member state's parliament would have to keep.
Zelenskyy's own answer was conditional in a way that is easy to lose in the retelling. He said Kyiv was not ready to concede territory, but that if it received a comprehensive package — security guarantees, the right to a strong and well-funded army, and funds to rebuild — he would put the question to a national referendum. He also refused the sequencing Moscow wants, insisting that a new European security architecture cannot come first: "We cannot turn everything upside down and start by talking about changing the security framework in the world or across the continent overall, and only then talk about ending this war. This war must be ended first."
And he was blunt about the other side's intentions, saying after US envoys reported no progress on an energy ceasefire: "Putin personally does not support a ceasefire."
So the week opened with a question nobody wanted to answer: not Washington, which would not confirm it; not Kyiv, which would only take it to a vote under conditions its own law currently forbids; and not Moscow, whose answer came later and in a different register.
A Deal That Cannot Be Signed
The people who floated the swap may have believed they were handing Kyiv a way out of the war. The law says they were handing it something no one in the room had the power to give.
Start with the alliance. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that the existing parties may, "by unanimous agreement," invite another European state to accede. NATO's own explanation, in its standing explainer, is blunter: "Any decision to invite a country to join the Alliance is taken by the North Atlantic Council on the basis of consensus among all Allies. No third country has a say in such deliberations." Ratification is national, and the United States requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate. A single member can block; no single member can grant.
The unanimity problem is not hypothetical. On 3 June 2026, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said the alliance did not then have unanimous support for Ukraine's full membership. Other members besides the United States are wary of membership for Ukraine, and Kyiv itself has treated it as unrealistic. A promise that requires every parliament in the alliance to say yes is not a promise one president can make on a Tuesday.
Ukraine's own law is the second wall, and it begins with the constitution itself. Article 73 states that "[i]ssues of altering the territory of Ukraine are resolved exclusively by an All-Ukrainian referendum" — so no president, parliament or treaty can cede Donbas without a nationwide vote. Article 157 of the Constitution bars amendments "oriented toward the liquidation of the independence or violation of the territorial indivisibility of Ukraine," and bars any constitutional amendment at all "in conditions of martial law or a state of emergency." The country remains under martial law, extended again in October 2026.
The constitution demands the referendum; it is statute that closes the route, and the distinction matters. Article 20 of Law No. 1135-IX prohibits both the calling and the holding of an all-Ukrainian referendum while martial law or a state of emergency remains in force. In a January 2026 analysis, the Ukrainian civil-society network OPORA refined the point: "The Constitution does not prohibit holding a referendum under martial law — the prohibition is provided for by the Law 'On Martial Law' and the Law 'On Nationwide Referendum.' Removing these prohibitions from the both law would pave the way to a referendum under martial law." In principle, then, the ban could be lifted. In practice, OPORA noted, a sustained ceasefire would have to cover the entire process — 60 days before voting and at least 30 days after — with six to nine months of preparation on top. That is a ceasefire long enough to be a settlement, which is the very thing the referendum is supposed to decide.
There is a further obstacle inside the institution that would have to bless any of this. Five of the Constitutional Court's 18 seats are vacant, possibly six by November 2026, and decisions require at least ten judges. A court that cannot reliably assemble a quorum is a thin reed for a territorial settlement.
Then there is the question of whether such a deal could survive its own origin. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that "a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force." No such treaty exists, and the legal analysts at Diplomacy and Law are careful about that: "No concluded Donbas-for-NATO treaty has been established. It is consequently premature to declare such an agreement valid or void. What can be said is that any future settlement involving territorial concessions obtained through Russia's unlawful military pressure would face a serious challenge under Article 52." The same analysis concludes that a Donbas-for-NATO settlement cannot be achieved by a US–Ukraine bilateral understanding alone.
Put the pieces together and the arithmetic is unforgiving. The swap requires unanimity in an alliance where unanimity is absent; a constitutional amendment in a country where amendments are barred under martial law; a nationwide referendum that the constitution demands, current statute forbids, and that would need a months-long ceasefire to be legitimate; a functioning constitutional court that is short of judges; and a treaty that would arrive under the shadow of the very force it is meant to end. None of these is a political preference a determined negotiator could talk around. Each is a rule with an owner, a procedure and a date.
That is the analytical spine of the week. The Donbas-for-NATO idea was not blocked by Russian intransigence alone — Moscow's refusal is real and comes later in this account — but by the architecture of the institutions that would have to deliver it. The proposal's authors either did not run the legal arithmetic or did not intend it to be run. Either way, the balloon was released into weather that could not carry it.
Shenzhen: The Summit That Forgot Ukraine
On 19 November 2026, in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen, the Chinese, Russian and US heads of state met face to face for the first time in history. The meeting ran 90 minutes on the sidelines of the APEC summit, or, by the Associated Press's count, roughly 70 minutes behind closed doors. It ended with a "Declaration toward Peace".
The declaration's four points are worth reading in full, because they are the entire substance of the week's central spectacle. The three countries committed to reform the UN, to increase the production and supply of refined petroleum products, to hold that state officials enjoy immunity and that the ICC "must not abuse their jurisdiction", and to reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
Ukraine is not in it. The declaration made no mention of Russia's war in Ukraine or the US-led war in Iran — the two conflicts that two of the three participants are actually fighting. The nuclear language, moreover, is the same formula previously issued by the five permanent members of the Security Council.
Here the record splits, and the split matters. The Chinese government's readout says the three leaders exchanged views on the Ukraine crisis, along with nuclear non-proliferation, the Middle East and Korea. The published declaration says nothing of the kind. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia's war in Ukraine wasn't the main topic of the three-way talks. Both accounts can be true at once — a subject can be raised and left out of the text — but the gap between what was discussed and what was signed is itself the story.
Trump had signalled the omission in advance. The White House said there were no plans for a bilateral Trump–Putin meeting, and Trump said he was not interested in discussing Ukraine at the summit, preferring nuclear arms control and Iran. At the summit he rejected new Russia sanctions, while China continued to provide Russia a financial lifeline after the US and its allies imposed sanctions.
The energy clause drew the sharpest reading. The Telegraph judged that "this would be a significant victory for Putin as an increase in global supply logically goes through Russia, which is currently sanctioned". The same paper's verdict on the declaration as a whole was blunter: "It really is thin stuff."
Analysts largely agreed. Prof William Hurst of Cambridge's Centre for Geopolitics said "very little of substance seems to have been accomplished" and called the summit "all about the symbolism and prestige value". He added that it was "no Yalta moment, but it was certainly a solid public demonstration of Russia's (and Putin's) continuing relevance and power". Patricia Kim of Brookings said the real test would be whether the three follow through on nuclear risk reduction, and that "Beijing has little interest in taking on the diplomatic risks of brokering an actual peace agreement in Ukraine or resolving the conflict with Iran". Nick Bisley of La Trobe called the staging of the three as the "Big Three" a "galling kind of picture." ABC News (Australia) found few concrete decisions on trade, Ukraine, Iran or AI.
The leaders' own words were grander. Trump said "We are really making history" and "No peace was ever forged by declining opportunities for engagement." Putin called it "a serious collaborative work" and told Xi, "I don't think anyone even expected things to go so well." Xi said "the seeds planted at today's trilateral meeting will surely take root, sprout, blossom and bear fruit" and that "as long as dialogue does not stop, doors remain open, there is hope for peace." He urged the three "not to challenge the red lines of one another" and said "The Thucydides Trap is by no means a destiny."
In Washington the reaction was not grand. Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer called it a "historic embarrassment". Republican Senator John Curtis said "Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are not our friends", and Senate Democrats including Schumer and Shaheen criticised the trilateral as a diplomatic embarrassment that secured no meaningful commitments on Ukraine. Senator Tim Kaine introduced a resolution seeking answers about purchases of Russian fuel and sanctions relief.
Hours later, Trump dialled into the Berlin meeting of more than 40 European leaders.
That is the evidence for what the Shenzhen trilateral was: a first-ever meeting of three nuclear-armed powers, staged as a peace summit, that produced a text about oil, courts and the UN. The symbolism was real and the prestige was real — for Putin above all, who last attended an APEC summit in 2017 and who used this one to stand beside both rivals. The settlement was not. Great-power summitry, on this showing, produced a photograph and a paragraph, not a peace.
The Yalta Doctrine
The Kremlin chose its own historical analogy, and it chose a loaded one. At the Shenzhen press conference Vladimir Putin insisted that "there was no division of the world into 'spheres of influence' at Yalta", that Yalta "simply acknowledged the realities that had emerged in the wake of the Second World War", and then delivered the sentence that matters: "Yalta merely codified the existing reality. And in today's conflicts, too, we will have to come to terms with the realities on the ground."
That is the doctrine in one line. "Realities on the ground" is not a description of the world; it is a demand that the world accept the map Russia drew with artillery. Russia's chief negotiator Vladimir Medinsky made the same argument in a softer register on Russian television, describing the goal as "a new modern Yalta or Potsdam" that would "ensure peace in Europe for decades, perhaps even centuries".
The analogy is contested, and the contest is the point. Outside Russia, Yalta is remembered as cynical trade-offs that discarded the countries not in the room — a reading that sits awkwardly beside a summit whose published text did not name the war in Europe at all. The Shenzhen meeting was over in less than two hours, with a five-paragraph "peace declaration". Ukraine's foreign minister Andrii Sybiha mocked the comparison: "Shenzhen is not the Yalta of Putin's dreams," he wrote, adding, "Time for him to wake up, get real, and end the war he can never win."
There is a serious contrarian case that the framing is fantasy. In an opinion piece, Al Jazeera argued that a "new Yalta" is "more of a case of wishful thinking than a realistic possibility", because the three leaders have divergent goals and the US and China are championing a bipolar "G2" rather than a three-power condominium. That is one outlet's judgement, not a finding, but it points at something real: a condominium requires agreed rules, and the three powers agree on almost nothing except that they should be the ones deciding.
What Russia is actually asking for becomes clearer when the Yalta language is set beside the text Moscow has circulated since 2021. Reporting during the Abu Dhabi round found Russia seeking to revive those 2021 demands, including a halt to further enlargement and restrictions on NATO forces in post-1997 joiners.
Medinsky's own language leaves little room for a negotiated middle. He said "every inch of our land will be returned to Russia, one way or another" and described the war as a disease of which Ukraine was only a symptom: "Essentially, the whole body is sick, and Ukraine was just a cyst that burst. The whole body must be cured. A Band-Aid won't be enough."
Not everyone reads the moment as a Russian demand. Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations argued that "We have to learn to work across the geopolitical and ideological dividing lines" — a view that treats great-power bargaining not as a threat to small states but as the only available mechanism for managing a multipolar world. Russia's foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova called the summit potentially the start of a return from "this slide into absolute chaos to stabilisation".
The two readings cannot both be right, and the evidence tilts one way. A Yalta that "codifies realities" ratifies conquest; a Yalta that manages competition leaves the map open. The record of the past week — a declaration that did not name the war, a Kremlin that invited Europeans to Moscow to "determine their position", and a negotiator who says every inch will be returned — points to the first. Whether the second ever becomes true depends on something the analogy cannot supply: whether the three powers can agree on rules they would all obey.
Berlin: Europe Buys a Ticket It May Not Be Allowed to Use
On the same day that three presidents posed in Shenzhen, more than 40 of Ukraine's partners gathered in Berlin under the banner of the Coalition of the Willing, and Donald Trump dialled in from Air Force One on his way home from China. The staging was deliberate: Europe wanted to be seen not as a spectator to a great-power bargain but as a party to it. "The US understands that there can be no peace without us," German Chancellor Friedrich Merz told reporters. "We, in turn, know that with the United States by our side, the prospects for peace increase."
The instrument Europe built for that claim is the E5 — Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Poland, working alongside the European Commission and Council. It was agreed at the informal Dublin summit on 12 November, and by the following week Brussels was signalling readiness to move to a multilateral format. "We are ready to move on to a multilateral format of the discussions," Paula Pinho, the Commission's chief spokesperson, said. "No venues have been discussed in particular, so we are not there yet."
That "not there yet" is the honest part. The format has visible blind spots: no Baltic or Nordic state sits in the group, even though Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would feel any cap on NATO's eastern presence most directly. The states with the most to lose from a settlement that limits allied deployments are the ones absent from the room where those limits would be drawn.
Then there is the question of whether the ticket will be honoured. Moscow has not agreed to it. Dmitry Peskov said Europe must show its "willingness to contribute to the peace process" before any decision, and cast doubt on the plan even as US envoys returned from Moscow touting Putin's "blessing". Yuri Ushakov said only a trilateral format had been agreed. Merz insisted it had "now been agreed" that Europe would join the next round, suggesting a "neutral" venue such as the Emirates rather than Moscow. Both cannot be true.
What Europe brought to Berlin was, in substance, a guarantee. Kushner said Trump was open to an Article 5-like commitment: "From America's perspective, giving an Article 5-like security guarantee is a really, really big deal," he said, adding that he and Witkoff had "gotten the Russians comfortable with the concept that any security guarantee for Ukraine would be based on Article 5". That claim is uncorroborated by Moscow, and the next day Russia's deputy foreign minister contradicted it in public. Kushner himself acknowledged that skepticism remained about Moscow's intentions.
Zelenskyy's response was the most precise thing said in Berlin. "I'm not sure that we have a common [understanding] of Article 5," he said, explaining that for him it means partner forces on Ukrainian soil — a reading the Americans had already closed off when they answered "No" to whether US troops would be deployed.
The joint statement that followed was robust on paper: Kyiv must receive robust, legally binding security guarantees once a ceasefire takes effect, borders must not be changed by force, and the architecture would include a US-led ceasefire monitoring mechanism and a European-led multinational force supported by Washington. None of that resolves the sequencing problem: guarantees are promised once a ceasefire takes effect, and the ceasefire is the thing that does not exist.
Europe's leaders spoke in the register of resolve. Merz said a "Yalta format cannot bring peace" and called Shenzhen a "photo op". French President Emmanuel Macron urged allies to "reopen the question" of Ukraine's NATO membership. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said "Mr Putin is not our friend and will never be". Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen found it "very incomprehensible that a US president wants to sit down with President Putin". British Prime Minister Andy Burnham promised Europe would "be there at the side of Ukraine" for as long as it takes. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte commended Trump's "Herculean efforts".
Trump's own contribution was a call from Air Force One. His message, he told Reuters, was that "everybody wants to make a deal, so let's make a deal", and he denied complaining to participants about European spending on the war. Politico, citing five European officials, reported he told the gathering Europe could save money and lives by ending the war — a message some officials heard as criticism of Europe's support for Kyiv; a US official briefed on the call said any suggestion Trump had told leaders to stop funding Ukraine was "not accurate".
The scepticism ran the other way too. Kushner had already stunned European leaders by saying Russia's security-architecture concerns had to be addressed, and he needled them over their inability to "identify one person to speak on their behalf" — a feat he called "a bigger achievement than getting the Russians to include them in the negotiation". Zelenskyy urged Europe to name a single peace envoy by the end of the month.
The structural dilemma was named best by Nigel Gould-Davies of the IISS: Europe "has to do its best to ensure there's no fundamental transatlantic breach" while also managing Russia, which he said is "playing the longer game" and hopes to see Europe "weaken and become more divided". EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas put the counter-argument to the whole framing: "We have one aggressor and one victim, and the aggressor does not have security concerns," she said. "Nobody has ever attacked them. They have attacked others."
Europe also brought money. Von der Leyen pointed to the bloc's proposed €45bn loan and a 22nd sanctions package "on the way". Leaders return to Ukraine's 2027 financing at the extraordinary European Council on 26 and 27 November.
So Berlin produced a paradox worth stating plainly. Europe has made itself indispensable to any settlement — it would fund it, police it and ratify it — and has converted that indispensability into a seat it may not be allowed to use. The E5 excludes the states most exposed to the deal's terms; Moscow has not confirmed the format; and the guarantee at the centre of the package is one Washington has not defined and Kyiv does not yet recognise. Merz gave each participant a piece of the Berlin Wall, saying the structure had brought "oppression, insecurity and a lack of peace". It was a good image. Whether Europe's own wall holds is a different question.
Moscow's Answer: No, and Come to Us One by One
If the week had one decisive answer, it came from Moscow — and it came in two registers that are easy to confuse.
The first was silence. On 16 November the Kremlin declined to comment on the idea of Ukraine ceding Donbas in return for NATO membership, saying it was inappropriate to disclose details of talks. That is not a rejection of the specific swap. It is a refusal to treat it as a real offer at all.
The second register was categorical. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said that even the notion of a formula for Ukraine's "quasi-membership" of NATO — the search for some "creative solution" — is "an option that is unacceptable to us". He set the precondition plainly: "let them recognise the irrevocable nature of our demand that this state must not join NATO". Only then, he said, could security guarantees be discussed "in one way or another". Interfax reported that Russia categorically rejects Ukraine's possible entry into NATO, and that there was still no agreement on the timing or location of the next round.
Set the two registers side by side and the shape of Russia's position becomes clear. Moscow does not discuss the swap as an offer, which would treat it as serious; it rejects the premise beneath it instead: Ukraine does not join NATO, in any form, under any name. On the swap itself the answer is silence; on everything the swap depends on, it is no.
Then there is the invitation, which is where the format play begins. Putin, in Shenzhen, said: "Through diplomatic channels, we proposed that the Europeans come to Moscow so that we can determine their position. After that, we will decide in what format to continue the dialogue with Ukraine." He added that the US side was asking Moscow "insistently - precisely insistently" to accept European participation, and that "discussing questions related to security in Europe without the Europeans is senseless".
Read that carefully. The invitation is not a concession to Europe; it is a summons. Europe is asked to come to Moscow to have its position "determined" — the verb is Putin's — before Russia decides the format. Ryabkov confirmed that a potential visit to Moscow by representatives from Britain, Germany and France was being worked on. The Europeans would arrive as petitioners, one delegation at a time, on Russian soil, with the shape of any future talks still in Moscow's gift.
The format question is where the Kremlin's answer is most precise. Ushakov said: "What is currently being discussed is holding the next round (of talks) in a trilateral format. These talks resumed in Abu Dhabi several days ago, and it was agreed that they would continue. The date has not yet been agreed and the expansion of the format - some people are talking about it - but it has not been agreed with us." Asked what it would take for Russia to consent, he said: "A great deal would have to be done before that could be agreed. In particular, it may be necessary to hold another round, or perhaps more than one round, of trilateral talks."
That directly contradicted Witkoff, who had said "The Europeans will join at the next meeting" and called their participation "a very important moment". Ushakov, in the same briefing, described Europe's current stance as "a recipe for endless war".
The red line underneath all of it is troops. Putin said: "We constantly repeat the same thing, that the deployment of any troops on Ukrainian territory is unacceptable to us." Days earlier he had told the Americans to get their allies to "make up their minds as to what they want: peace or war in Ukraine". The message to Europe is consistent: come, but come on our terms, and do not bring an army.
The pattern was already visible in Abu Dhabi, where Russia's delegation refused to meet European officials and NATO representatives, and where Medinsky dismissed the European envoys' presence by saying that if they had come "as tourists" they could talk in the hotel lobby. He also said that "a great deal depends on Ukraine, on the US stance, and on whether Europe comes to its senses".
What the record does settle is the direction of Moscow's answer. Russia has not accepted the Donbas-for-NATO premise, has not accepted European participation in the next round, and has not agreed a date or a venue. It has offered Europe a trip to Moscow instead — a format in which each capital states its position separately, to Russia, before Russia decides what comes next. Inviting the Europeans one by one, on Russian soil, is not a step toward a settlement. It is a way of ensuring that when the format is finally set, Europe has already been divided.
The Money Track: Diesel, Lukoil and €45 Billion
While the territorial question stalled, a parallel track advanced — and it advanced in the currency of Russian revenue. On 9 October 2026 the US Treasury temporarily waived some sanctions on Russia to let it export diesel, and later issued a licence clearing the sale and import of Russian diesel until 7 April 2027. Under the arrangement announced in October 2026, Russia would supply more than 2.25 million barrels of diesel to US and global markets. In October 2026, US envoys told Ukrainian officials in Miami that the deal was meant to "soften" Moscow's position, because it "sends a signal that Trump is open to do things" with Russia. The same meeting covered reconstruction funds for Ukraine and a US request that Kyiv stop striking Russian refineries.
The results are documented, though the sourcing is thin. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air estimated that Russian energy companies had already exported $1.9 billion of diesel since the relief took effect. American diesel retail prices averaged $6.25 from 12 October to 9 November, against $6.20 the week the relief was announced — and the real driver of high fuel prices was the Iran war, not sanctions or Ukrainian strikes on refineries. Russia loaded nearly 11 million barrels of diesel and gasoil for export, a 165% increase over September. These figures rest on a single origin — the Wall Street Journal, relayed by The New Voice of Ukraine — and on anonymous Reuters sources, and should be read with that in mind.
The commercial menu is wider than diesel. Washington and Moscow have discussed reviving joint production off Sakhalin and involving US oil companies in restoring Russian crude exports to Europe through the Druzhba pipeline, alongside titanium exports and reopening Russian airspace to American airlines. The Kremlin confirmed talks over Lukoil after Putin's 21 October meeting with Witkoff in St Petersburg; the portfolio was initially valued at approximately $22 billion, and the US Treasury extended authorisation for negotiations over its sale until 21 November. No final decisions have been made, and these figures too rest on a single origin — the Financial Times, relayed by the Kyiv Post. Zelenskyy warned that Moscow could offer Washington an "economic marriage" built around its natural resources.
For Ukraine, the money track runs the other way. The European Commission has proposed up to €45 billion in additional support for 2027, split into up to €25 billion for military assistance and up to €20 billion for budget support. The structure is unusual: Ukraine would be required to repay the principal only once it receives reparations from Russia, with part of the package financed through windfall profits on immobilised Russian sovereign assets. The package addresses an estimated €70 billion financing gap for 2027 and follows the €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan agreed for 2026–2027. A separate mechanism would allow up to €5 billion in additional EU loans backed by guarantees from AAA-rated third countries.
The history of these instruments is a history of near-misses. The €90 billion loan, agreed in December 2025, was itself a compromise after European leaders failed to agree on a proposed interest-free reparations loan of almost €140 billion, which floundered over how to share legal and liquidity risks concentrated in Belgium and Euroclear. The G7's $50 billion ERA loan, agreed under Italy's 2024 presidency, has mostly been disbursed; Kyiv had received about €15.7 billion under the USL by early October. In an October 2026 analysis, Carnegie analysts floated an ERA 2.0 loan of €30–50 billion as one option.
Von der Leyen framed the package as pressure as much as support: "Europe will continue to ensure maximum support to Ukraine and maximum pressure on Russia."
Put the two tracks side by side and the week's incentive structure becomes visible. One set of measures relieved pressure on Russian energy exports and opened a commercial conversation about Russian assets; the other extended loans to Ukraine that are repayable only from reparations that may never come. The diesel figures suggest the relief enriched Moscow without lowering American prices — an attributed finding, not a settled one, resting on a single outlet's analysis. What the record does show is that while the territorial question stalled, the money moved, and it moved in both directions at once.
While They Talked: Kerch, Starshield and the Winter Grid
The diplomacy had a soundtrack, and it was explosions.
On the eve of the Shenzhen trilateral, Ukrainian forces partially destroyed the Kerch Bridge — the 19-kilometre road and rail link Russia built to connect its mainland to occupied Crimea, and which Ukraine has damaged before, in 2022, 2023 and 2025. The timing was not accidental: the strike was aimed at the showcase project of the Russian president as he prepared to sit down with Trump and Xi.
Putin's answer came at his own press conference. "After the strikes on the Crimean Bridge, we will not negotiate," he said, insisting the bridge was used only by civilians and promising a response "far more painful than Kyiv's attack on the bridge." Ukraine's military gave a different account of what the bridge is: "the main land artery the Russian army uses to supply its occupation groupings in the south with fuel, ammunition and equipment." Both statements are on the record; they cannot both be true.
Analysts read the strike as pressure rather than a knockout. John Helin of the Atlantic Council said the more important story was "the growing pressure Ukraine is putting on Russia's logistics system as a whole." Franz-Stefan Gady of CNAS put it in five words: "More traffic means more targets." With the bridge partly disabled, Russia must push more convoys through the M-14 corridor it already struggles to protect. Gady also named the limit: a sudden logistical breakdown is unlikely because Russia disperses and drives at night, and "[t]he real question is whether Ukraine can keep the bridge out while also sustaining pressure on the corridor".
The battlefield week did not pause for the diplomacy. During the Abu Dhabi talks, Russia hit six electricity substations in central Ukraine, and an attack on a market in the Odesa region killed three people. Moscow also turned down a proposal for a ceasefire on energy targets, Zelenskyy said: "On the proposal for an energy ceasefire: the Russians don't want it."
Then there is the satellite question, which is where the "adjacent agenda" stops being adjacent.
Between 13 and 24 October 2026, restrictions on Starlink and its military version Starshield disrupted communications used by Ukrainian forces, including the interceptor drones that defend cities against Russian missiles and drones. During that window Russia launched nearly 4,000 aerial attacks. Service was restored on 24 October. On 12 November it was disrupted again, across the entire front line and in occupied territory. Zelenskyy said the speed restrictions "remain in place along the entire front line and in temporarily-occupied territories of Ukraine"; interceptor drones lose contact with their operators above 161 kph, leaving them unable to catch Shaheds. He added that the restrictions "send Russia a signal that America may somehow treat our temporarily-occupied land differently."
Who ordered it is unresolved, and the record shows why. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote to Musk that he had asserted the limitations were "decisions made by the U.S. military and ultimately the President," while Hegseth "subsequently suggested that SpaceX could impose restrictions unilaterally" and Rubio "stated that decisions regarding Starlink access likewise rested with SpaceX." SpaceX has provided no explanation. Three senior officials, three accounts; none of them can be confirmed from the public record.
The war's spillover kept pace. Romania's prime minister said three commercial vessels in the Black Sea were struck by drones, calling the incidents "unacceptable and ... a violation of international law." Estonia said it would close all border crossings with Russia from 1 December after an alleged sabotage attempt against a drone company; its prime minister said Russian intelligence "exploit[s] border crossings to exert influence over people."
And on 20 November, as Putin invited Europeans to Moscow, Russia struck Kyiv's infrastructure again. Over the preceding week Russia fired more than 2,300 drones, 1,590 guided aerial bombs and 15 missiles, and a strike on Chornomorsk temporarily left about 41,000 customers without power.
Set beside the money track, the satellite story changes the shape of the week. The diesel licence relieved pressure on Russian export revenue; the satellite restrictions constrained Ukraine's ability to intercept the drones hitting its grid. Who ordered the second remains unresolved — Washington, SpaceX, or no one who will say — but the effect ran one way. That is not an adjacent agenda; it is pressure applied while the talking continued.
What Ukrainians Actually Think
The deal is about Ukraine, and Ukrainians have been asked about it — not in a referendum, but in surveys that are more methodologically careful than most of the diplomacy around them.
The most rigorous reading comes from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, which surveyed 1,031 respondents by telephone between 8 and 16 October 2026 on territory controlled by the Ukrainian government. Its finding, published on 19 October: 61% consider it categorically unacceptable to transfer the entire Donbas under Russian control in exchange for security guarantees, while 35% are ready for such a concession, most of them acknowledging it is a difficult condition.
Then the pressure test. KIIS split its sample around the announcement of the diesel deal. Among those surveyed on 8–9 October, before the deal, 57% were categorically against; among those surveyed on 10–16 October, 62%. The institute itself cautioned that the difference is within the margin of error — and that, at least for now, the pressure campaign has not produced any greater readiness to accept the proposal. That caveat matters: this is not a trend, it is a snapshot that failed to move.
What Ukrainians expect is a separate question, and the answers are bleak. Only 10% expect the war to end by the end of 2026, while 56% expect it in the second half of 2027 or later; 62% are ready to endure as long as necessary.
Trust in the guarantees is where the arithmetic gets uncomfortable for the deal's architects. Asked whether partners would honour guarantees and help if Russia attacked again after a settlement, "56% said Europe would and 38% said it would not." For the United States the result was reversed: 54% said it would not help and 32% said it would.
Gallup's survey, conducted in April and published on 30 June, found that "66% of Ukrainian adults said the country should seek a negotiated end" as soon as possible, against 24% who said it should keep fighting until it wins. Approval of US leadership stood at 7%, with 79% disapproving. And the share who think Washington is pushing Ukraine towards concessions rose to 61% in October from 56% in May.
One number circulating this week should be handled with care. A Radio NV audience poll of 2,207 people found 75.9% rejected any withdrawal from Donbas in exchange for NATO membership, with only 5.9% saying it should be considered immediately. The outlet itself states plainly that "the poll results are not representative of Ukraine's population as a whole." It is a signal of sentiment among one outlet's audience, not evidence of national opinion.
Read together, the surveys point one way. Ukrainians want the war to end, they doubt the guarantees on offer, and they do not read pressure as a reason to concede. The obstacle to the deal is not the Ukrainian public. It is the deal's own architecture — and, as the polling suggests, the fact that the people it is about have already done the arithmetic.
The Precedent Trap: 2021, Minsk, Istanbul
The week's diplomacy looked improvised, and in one sense it was. But the texts on the table have ancestors, and the ancestors are the strongest argument against reading any of this as a historic breakthrough. Three documents keep returning: the December 2021 draft treaties, the Minsk package of 2015, and the Istanbul draft of April 2022. Each was presented as a settlement. None settled anything.
Begin with December 2021, because that is where the current Russian position actually lives. Moscow published two draft treaties, one addressed to Washington and one to NATO, and the American text was explicit. "The United States of America shall undertake to prevent further eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and deny accession to the Alliance to the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," Article 4 read. The same article added that Washington "shall not establish military bases in the territory of the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," nor use their infrastructure for military activity.
The reception is worth recalling. In February 2022, Steven Pifer of Brookings wrote that "the unacceptable provisions in the two draft agreements, their quick publication by the Russian government, and the peremptory terms used by Russian officials to describe Moscow's demands raise concern that the Kremlin may want rejection." The IISS was blunter about the substance in January 2022: "Both of the 2021 drafts would end NATO enlargement, compromise the sovereignty of other states, and curtail US and Allied ability to cooperate, conduct exercises, or deploy forces anywhere near Russian borders, establishing a de jure sphere of influence." The institute also noted that Russia's earlier attempt, in 2009, ended without any negotiations on its texts at all.
That is the first half of the pattern, and The Observer named its return this month: "Russia's latest position harks back to the 'draft treaties' it proposed in December 2021 demanding cast-iron guarantees that countries such as Ukraine and Georgia would never be allowed to join Nato." Moscow also demanded then that the alliance's military infrastructure be rolled back from central and eastern European countries that joined after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The demand has not changed; only the venue has.
Minsk is the second ancestor, and it is the one that shows how a signed text can mean nothing. The package agreed on 12 February 2015 opened with an "immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine and its strict implementation starting from 00.00 AM (Kiev time) on the 15th of February, 2015," followed by heavy-weapons withdrawal, OSCE monitoring, local elections, amnesty, an all-for-all prisoner exchange and constitutional reform granting special status to parts of Donbas. In February 2024, the European Council on Foreign Relations called them agreements in name only, because "none of the provisions in the agreements explicitly assigned any obligation to Moscow," which allowed Russia to present itself as a mediator in a Ukrainian domestic conflict rather than a party to it. There was also no agreed order in which the provisions were to be carried out — the sequencing dispute that killed them.
Istanbul is the third. In April 2022, negotiators produced a draft that the Institute for the Study of War describes in terms that make the current proposal look generous: "The Istanbul draft agreement surrenders Ukraine's sovereignty and prohibits any efforts by Ukraine or any other state to maintain Ukrainian armed forces adequate to deter or defend against, a future Russian attack." It would have required Kyiv to strip the NATO membership clause from its constitution, adopt neutrality, and accept a security-response mechanism in which Russia and China held a veto. And it was never agreed. As Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies put it, "although the talks between Ukraine and Russia were based on the content of the March Communique, consensus was not reached on the subsequent draft treaty" — a point worth holding against the frequent claim that a deal was there for the taking in Istanbul.
One item in this cluster remains unresolved and should be labelled as such. The German newspaper Bild reported that Russia has also demanded that Finland withdraw from Nato, a suggestion Helsinki dismissed as "absolutely outrageous". Finland's defence minister, Antti Häkkänen, told reporters: "Such matters are in no way a matter for negotiation. Russia knows that." The Kremlin's spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, denied reports that Russia had demanded Finland leave Nato. The record does not settle it, and it should not be reported as fact in either direction.
The pattern is not that history repeats. It is narrower and more useful than that: the same maximalist text keeps being re-tabled, and the same maximalist text keeps being mistaken for a negotiating position. In 2021 the drafts were read as an opening bid and were in fact an ultimatum. In 2015 Minsk was read as a settlement and was in fact a postponement. In 2022 Istanbul was read as a near-deal and was in fact a draft that never reached consensus. Each time, the gap between what the document said and what the parties meant was the whole story. That is the trap the current round has walked into again — and it is why the word "historic" should be handled with gloves.
The Strongest Objection: What If Kushner Is Right?
The case for the swap deserves to be stated at full strength, because it is not stupid. Ukraine cannot reconquer Donbas by force: Russia occupies roughly a fifth of Ukrainian territory, including most of Donetsk and Luhansk, and has held the line for years. NATO membership is the only guarantee Kyiv's own public would trust. Russia's complaints about the alliance's eastward reach are not invented — they are written into the draft treaties Moscow circulated in December 2021. And the man who has spent the past month in the room says the other side has moved: Kushner said in Berlin that Washington had made Moscow comfortable with an Article 5-based guarantee. If that is true, then the Donbas-for-NATO formula is not a fantasy but the only creative path left: trade land Ukraine cannot retake for the alliance it cannot otherwise join.
That is the objection. Here is why the evidence does not carry it.
First, the claim of Russian comfort is contradicted on the record, and by the official whose portfolio covers exactly this question. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said on 20 November — the day after Kushner spoke in Berlin — that even a formula for Ukraine's quasi-membership in NATO — or some "creative solution" — is unacceptable, and set a precondition that inverts the entire proposal: Ukraine must be recognised, in advance, as never joining NATO at all.
Second, even if Moscow agreed, the deal cannot be executed by the parties who floated it: as the legal record above shows, it needs a unanimous alliance, a referendum that Ukraine's constitution requires and its law forbids under martial law, and a treaty that would face a serious challenge as one obtained by force. The swap is not merely politically hard; it is institutionally undeliverable by the actors who proposed it.
Third, the sequencing runs backwards. Zelenskyy's condition is that this war must be ended first — not that a new European security architecture be negotiated first, which is Moscow's order of operations. The two sequences cannot both be satisfied.
Fourth, the guarantee's deterrent value is unclear even on Washington's own account. Zelenskyy said the US is offering guarantees similar to Articles 4 and 5, but when he asked whether American troops would be on Ukrainian soil, Washington answered "No." He added that he was not sure there was a common understanding of Article 5. An Article 5-like pledge without forces, without membership and without a ratified treaty is a promise whose credibility depends on the willingness of future governments to honour it.
Fifth, the proposal's own logic points away from it. Harry Nedelcu of Rasmussen Global told Al Jazeera the pitch tests how much Donbas really matters to Russia — and concluded that everything indicates the Russians will never accept this.
So the objection is serious, and it fails on the evidence. The strongest version of the Kushner case requires Moscow to accept a Ukrainian NATO guarantee it has categorically rejected, requires Kyiv to concede territory its law forbids it to concede, and requires an alliance of thirty-plus members to agree unanimously to admit a country at war. None of those conditions is met, and the one actor said to have softened has spent the week saying no. What the balloon tested was not whether peace was possible. It was whether anyone would notice that the question had no answer.
What Happens Next: Three Scenarios and the Signals to Watch
The week ended without a date, a venue or an agreed format, and that absence is the most reliable fact about what comes next. Moscow and Berlin describe the next round differently, and the space between their accounts is where the next fortnight will be decided.
Three scenarios follow from the evidence. The first two are alternatives — the next round either seats Europe or it does not — so their likelihoods are read together; the third could happen in either format. Each has a signal that would confirm or kill it.
Europe seated, on neutral ground — a realistic possibility. The basis is thin but real: Merz's claim that participation is settled, the European Commission's declared readiness to move to a multilateral format while conceding it is not there yet, and Putin's own statement that Russia was not opposed to European participation but needed to understand what Europe would bring. What would confirm it is a formal Kremlin statement naming a date and a European role. Until that exists, the European seat is an assertion by one side, not a fact.
The round stays trilateral — likely. This is where the documented record points. Ushakov said Russia's consent would first require more trilateral rounds. Peskov said Moscow would not dictate Europe's team, but Russia has not formally accepted a European role and no date exists. What could still move it is sustained American pressure: Putin said the US side was asking Moscow insistently to accept European participation.
A Donbas-for-NATO deal formally tabled and put to a Ukrainian referendum — highly unlikely. Every legal wall described above would have to fall at once, and Moscow would have to drop the precondition it restated this week. The first sign of movement would be a bill in the Verkhovna Rada to amend the referendum law — the one step that is entirely within Kyiv's hands.
Three signals, then, are worth more than any communiqué. First, whether the Kremlin formally confirms European participation and a date; Ushakov's language this week was a refusal dressed as a procedural note. Second, what EU leaders decide at their end-of-November summit on the 2028–2034 budget, where they return to Ukraine's financing needs for 2027 — money being Europe's strongest card. Third, whether any Ukrainian parliamentary move on the referendum law appears at all.
What is genuinely unknown should be said plainly. No formal written American proposal has surfaced; the full Shenzhen declaration and its annexes have not been published; and the text of the next EU sanctions package is not yet public. Merz gave no date and named the UAE only as a possible site, while telling reporters that "these talks are now set to take place soon". If none of the three signals moves, the next round remains trilateral, Europe remains consulted rather than seated, and the balloon will have told us only about the weather.
Conclusion: The Balloon and the Weather
The week's real finding is not that a deal failed. Deals fail constantly, and most fail quietly. The finding is narrower and more uncomfortable: the boldest Western idea for ending the war was a land-for-alliance trade that the actors who floated it cannot deliver, discussed in a forum that excluded the states that would have to ratify, fund and police it.
No binding agreement was reached. The Donbas-for-NATO idea remains an exploratory American question that Washington has never confirmed; Russia rejects any Ukrainian NATO membership or quasi-membership; Europe's seat at the next round is unconfirmed by Moscow; and no date or venue has been set. Those are the facts the week leaves behind, and they are less dramatic than the headlines that accompanied them.
The verdict has three parts. The proposal was a probe, not a plan. The summit was symbolism, not settlement. And the money and the battlefield moved while the diplomacy posed.
Take the summit first, because it is the easiest to mistake for substance. The three heads of state met in Shenzhen and issued a declaration that made no mention of Ukraine — the war that two of the three participants are fighting or fuelling. The analysts quoted here found the text thin. Prof William Hurst of Cambridge's Centre for Geopolitics judged it a summit of symbolism rather than substance, and not a Yalta moment but a demonstration of Russia's continuing relevance. The contrarian reading of the Yalta framing points the same way: a new Yalta, one opinion piece argued, is wishful thinking rather than a realistic prospect.
Then the deal itself. Its undeliverability was a matter of architecture, not political will: an alliance that decides by unanimity, a constitution that demands a referendum the law currently forbids, and a Kremlin that wants Ukraine's non-membership recognised before guarantees can even be discussed.
The implications fall differently on each side. For Europe, the E5 format buys a seat Moscow has not confirmed and leaves out the Baltic and Nordic states most exposed to its terms. Nigel Gould-Davies of the IISS framed the dilemma precisely: Europe must hold the transatlantic line while also managing Russia. For Ukraine, the constitution, the referendum law and public opinion are not obstacles to be overcome but the terms of its sovereignty — and the October polling suggests the pressure campaign has not moved them, with 61% still calling any transfer of Donbas categorically unacceptable.
What comes next is open, but the most likely outcome is the least dramatic one: a round that stays trilateral, with Europe consulted rather than seated. The signal to watch is a Kremlin statement that names a date and a European role; until it comes, Europe's seat is an assertion by one side, and the Donbas-for-NATO question stays where the week left it — unanswerable by the people who asked it.
That is the image to keep. A balloon released to read the wind tells you about the weather, not about the destination. The week produced a question, a photo opportunity and a rejection, and the most useful thing it revealed was not where the parties are going but how little of the architecture for getting there actually exists.
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