The Return of the Silk Road

On July 17, analysts’ attention has once again turned to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by Xi Jinping more than a decade ago. The reason: record levels of investment. In just the first half of 2025, BRI deals reached a total value of $124 billion, including $44 billion in the energy sector and $25 billion in metallurgy. These are the highest figures since the program’s inception in 2013, as noted by the Griffith Asia Institute.

The BRI initiative, also known as “One Belt, One Road,” was officially introduced in 2013 with the goal of creating a new system of global trade routes — over land (the Silk Road Economic Belt) and sea (the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road). Today, it spans over 150 countries and includes hundreds of projects across Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. According to data from the World Economic Forum, by 2024 the total value of signed contracts exceeded $1.175 trillion, including $70.7 billion in new projects for 2024 alone.

The core goals of the initiative remain unchanged: infrastructure connectivity, trade development, policy coordination, financial integration, and “people-to-people ties” among participating countries, as outlined in China’s official government position. However, over the past decade, the program has expanded far beyond infrastructure investment — it has become a strategic tool of Beijing’s foreign policy.

According to the CSIS China Power Project, the transformation of BRI has become particularly noticeable in the last two years: China has shifted focus from lending to foreign direct investment (FDI), especially in high-tech sectors, green energy, and logistics. This indicates the “maturation” of BRI — from financial expansionism to a strategy of long-term presence and control over key nodes in the global economy.

As the Green Finance & Development Center notes, the most dynamic growth has been seen in renewable energy projects, as well as in countries across the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa. At the same time, China’s expansion in Europe continues, with Serbia remaining one of the most critical partner hubs.

Serbia in the BRI System: Investment, Influence, and the Price of Opacity

Serbia was one of the first European countries to sign a memorandum of cooperation with China under the Belt and Road framework. Since then, it has become a key node in the Balkans within China’s strategy of transport connectivity with the European Union, as well as a laboratory for testing Chinese involvement models in infrastructure, energy, and industry.

According to Blue Europe, the total volume of Chinese investments in Serbia since the early 2010s exceeds $10 billion, including foreign direct investments, state loans, and project financing. Other estimates indicate that between 2010 and 2023, the total amount is around €5.5 billion, of which €1.4 billion came in 2022 alone — a record figure.

Among the major sectors:

• Mining industry: In 2018, the Chinese company Zijin Mining acquired 63% of the Serbian copper giant RTB Bor for $1.26 billion. This was one of the country’s largest privatization contracts.

• Metallurgy: In 2016, Hesteel Group bought the steel plant in Smederevo. The plant ranks among Serbia’s largest employers and exporters.

• Automotive: Chinese companies such as Minth Automotive have invested in the production of car components in Šabac and Loznica.

• IT and telecom: Companies like Hisense are developing electronics manufacturing, while Chinese equipment is widely used in Serbian telecommunications infrastructure.

• Infrastructure: This includes flagship projects such as the reconstruction of the Belgrade–Budapest railway, highways, bridges, and even a metro project in Belgrade.

• Energy: In 2024, a €2 billion memorandum was signed with Shanghai Fengling for the construction of solar, wind, and hydrogen facilities with a total capacity of 2 GW, to be implemented by 2028 (Reuters).

The Belgrade–Budapest railway is the central segment of the transport corridor from the Chinese port of Piraeus in Greece to Central Europe, with a total cost of $2.89 billion. The Serbian portion alone cost approximately $350 million just for the Belgrade–Stara Pazova section, which, according to experts from Strategic Analysis, significantly exceeds European averages for cost per kilometer.

The Tragedy in Novi Sad: A BRI Consequence or a Horrific Accident?

Station Reconstruction — Part of a BRI Project

The main train station in Novi Sad was reconstructed from 2021 to mid-2024 as part of the high-speed Belgrade–Budapest railway project, carried out by Chinese contractors CRIC and CCCC — China Railway International Co. and China Communications Construction Company. The official reopening of the renovated building took place on July 5, 2024.

Thus, the tragedy involving the collapse of the station canopy is directly linked to the large-scale BRI project in Serbia.

The Tragedy and the Protests

On November 1, 2024, a concrete canopy collapsed onto the platform, killing 16 people. This became the catalyst for mass protests: students and civil activists demanded full publication of the reconstruction documents and accountability for those responsible — something your humble servant covered last time here.

From Experts — on the Causes and Missing Data

• The Faculty of Civil Engineering at the University of Belgrade published a list of key missing documents, including the contract dated May 28, 2018, between the Serbian government, Serbian Railway Infrastructure, and the Chinese consortium JV CRIC-CCCC, as reported by European Western Balkans.

• According to Transparency Serbia, the ministry partially released documents, but omitted key agreements related to finances, subcontractors, and quality control.

• Transparency Serbia also stated that some documents previously available on official platforms (including CEOP, the Central Public Procurement Records Portal) became inaccessible to the public after the incident.

• Reddit users, citing engineering forums and professional reports, noted that the load-bearing structures were overloaded by approximately 107 kg/m² beyond the norm, the steel was corroded, and visible signs of wear had been ignored.

What Experts Demand

• The full public contract, including work and financing conditions, with details on the division of responsibilities between CRIC and CCCC, as well as subcontractors — the document dated May 28, 2018, remains unpublished.

• Technical documentation: project design, load reports, acceptance certificates for structures, lab test reports on steel — all of this is either missing or only partially available.

Without these materials, reconstructing the causes of the tragedy is impossible, which calls into question the integrity of the investigation.

Impact on Civil Movement

The catastrophe became a symbol in the fight against corruption and opacity. Schoolchildren, students, and trade unions have organized marches, hunger strikes, and work stoppages; a significant part of the protest movement demands the release and full disclosure of all reconstruction documents. This has become the most powerful protest movement in Serbia since 2024.

As emphasized in a report by CEPA (Center for European Policy Analysis), the main criticism of Chinese projects in Serbia concerns the absence of open tenders, direct intergovernmental agreements, and the secrecy of contract conditions — from cost to technical specifications. CEPA directly states that Chinese companies “operate outside the EU’s standard transparency framework,” and the documents related to key projects have not been made publicly available.

Similar criticism appears in the Financial Times, which highlights that the railway project is being implemented without the Serbian parliament or auditors having access to the agreement’s details, despite its strategic importance. The same applies to the Pupin Bridge project in Belgrade — as noted by Blue Europe, it was executed with inflated costs and without competitive procedures.

This situation is largely attributed to political will — the speed of construction and the scale of the projects are decisive factors. In contrast to the EU, which demands strict environmental and financial standards, BRI offers a more flexible but less transparent mechanism — which proves attractive for countries seeking rapid modernization.

Debt Silk: Criticism of BRI and Warnings of the “Dependency Trap”

Despite the outwardly impressive volumes of investment and scale of the projects, the Belt and Road Initiative has, from the very beginning, been accompanied by skepticism from Western analysts and international institutions. The main concern is the risk of debt dependency, particularly in countries with low economic resilience.

The most well-known case is Sri Lanka. In 2017, the country’s authorities were forced to lease the Hambantota Port to the Chinese side for 99 years after failing to repay a debt of around $1.4 billion, as documented in reviews on Wikipedia and in AP materials.

A similar situation developed in Pakistan, where China is implementing the massive China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). According to CSIS China Power, the total value of projects exceeds $60 billion, significantly increasing the country’s debt burden and raising concerns among the IMF and Western partners. In Zimbabwe, Chinese projects have been accompanied by agreements that limit the country’s sovereignty over its natural resources — particularly in the mining sector.

All of these examples fuel the narrative of Beijing’s so-called “debt diplomacy,” in which infrastructure investments are transformed into mechanisms of political influence and strategic control over key assets in recipient countries.

Serbia and the Risks of Non-Transparency

Although Serbia is not a typical case of default vulnerability, it is the opacity of Chinese investment conditions that raises concern both domestically and among international observers. Unlike EU mechanisms, BRI projects are often formalized without open tenders and without disclosure of financial terms.

As highlighted by Strategic Analysis, the cost of the Serbian section of the Belgrade–Budapest railway is significantly higher than that of similar segments in the EU. The reason is attributed to closed intergovernmental agreements under which Chinese contractors receive exclusive terms, while the contracts themselves remain inaccessible to public scrutiny.

Journalists and civil society activists also point to the absence of published data on the exact project costs, volumes of state guarantees, and Serbia’s legal obligations. The CEPA report emphasizes that neither the Serbian Parliament nor the State Audit Institution had access to full copies of contracts for several strategic projects — from highways to energy agreements.

Moreover, many analysts point to Serbia’s growing dependence on Chinese contractors in key sectors — from transport to energy. According to several international reports, this practice creates institutional inertia: future governments may find themselves compelled to continue working with the same actors, as the legal and financial obligations embedded in existing contracts leave little room for maneuver.

Europe’s Answer: Global Gateway and the Battle for Standards

In response to China’s growing influence through the BRI, the European Union launched its own global strategy — the Global Gateway — officially presented in December 2021. According to the description on Wikipedia, the project has a budget of up to €300 billion through 2027, aimed at investments in infrastructure, digitalization, green technologies, and healthcare in partner countries.

Global Gateway seeks to be a transparent alternative to Chinese investment, especially in the Western Balkans. The main distinctions of the EU initiative include:

• all contracts are subject to open tenders and independent auditing;

• compliance with environmental sustainability, social responsibility, and corporate governance standards (ESG);

• priority is given to projects that respect local community rights and minimize environmental risks;

• there is no long-term dependency on a single technology provider or contractor.

However, as noted by the Green Finance & Development Center, the EU’s approach faces several limitations. Chief among them are longer approval processes, bureaucratic overhead, and the absence of the “instant impact” typically delivered by Chinese projects. This is especially relevant in countries where political leadership seeks quick results from infrastructure investments.

Serbia is a prime example of such a dilemma. Despite its official EU candidate status and participation in EU-funded projects, the country continues to work actively with China, citing the flexibility, speed, and scale of Chinese offers. At the same time, none of the major BRI projects in Serbia meet EU standards of competitiveness and transparency, as emphasized by CEPA analysts.

This balance between East and West creates a structural duality: on one hand, Serbia declares adherence to European norms; on the other — it accepts terms of cooperation with Beijing that involve minimal public oversight. As Strategic Analysis notes, this model “offers short-term advantages but may limit the country in the long term — both institutionally and in terms of foreign policy.”

The Silk Crossroads: Between Opportunity and Transparency

China’s Belt and Road Initiative continues to evolve — from a mega-project of infrastructure development into a tool of long-term influence. In 2025, amid geopolitical tensions and rising competition with the U.S. and the EU, the program is showing record activity: $124 billion in investments in just six months, with a focus on energy, technology, and direct investment rather than previous emphasis on loans (Griffith Asia Institute).

Serbia remains one of the central European hubs of BRI. Over the past 15 years, the country has attracted more than $10 billion in Chinese investments in infrastructure, metallurgy, energy, and digital technology. Projects such as the Belgrade–Budapest railway, the Smederevo steel plant, the RTB Bor mining complex, and the new €2 billion “green” energy program confirm high investment activity (Reuters, CEPA).

However, alongside its investment appeal, BRI carries structural risks: lack of transparency, closed agreements, absence of parliamentary oversight, and dependence on contractors from a single country. As shown by the cases of Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe, such mechanisms can evolve into debt traps and long-term erosion of economic sovereignty (CSIS, AP).

The EU offers an alternative in the form of the Global Gateway initiative, emphasizing sustainability, open tenders, and environmental standards. But due to smaller financial volumes and stricter requirements, many countries — including Serbia — continue to balance between Chinese funding and European rules.

Thus, Serbia finds itself at the crossroads of two systems: on one hand — promises of rapid modernization through Chinese projects; on the other — the EU’s demand for institutional transparency. The answer to where the country will turn in the future depends not only on geopolitics, but on the capacity of domestic institutions to ensure accountability, public oversight, and strategic planning.