Tomahawk as Threat and Bluff: What Trump Actually Said — and What It Changes for the War

September–October 2025. US President Donald Trump publicly suggests transferring Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine; Kyiv welcomes the signal, Moscow warns of "escalation," NATO strengthens coordination, and production and legal constraints crawl to the forefront. This is not a report about a deal, but an analysis: what lies behind Trump's phrase — bluff, bargaining, or testing red lines; and whether the threat can transform into a real logistics operation.

What Exactly Trump Said — and Why the "Might" Formula Matters

When the president says "I might send them Tomahawks", every word carries weight. Not "will send" — an ironclad promise. Not "considering" — cautious weighing. Precisely "might" — a modality of possibility, leaving room for maneuver.

Fox News reports that the transfer is possible if Russia continues the war. The formula is simple and harsh — keep fighting, get long-range weapons. Stop — the question is dropped. This isn't humanitarian aid, it's bargaining where each side knows the price of retreat.

Rhetorical ambiguity here works as a weapon in itself, though it remains unclear whether Trump's word choice is a deliberate pressure strategy or reflects genuine uncertainty in the political process. Moscow is forced to plan scenarios accounting for possible delivery. Kyiv gains a bargaining chip, even if the missiles never arrive in Ukrainian warehouses. And all this — on one word: "might."

Kyiv Reads the Signal: Moscow's Fear as a Resource

Volodymyr Zelensky knows the value of a good signal. "We see and feel that Russia fears the possibility that the Americans will provide us with Tomahawks", the Ukrainian president declared. How much this reflects real Kremlin concerns or is an element of diplomatic positioning is difficult to verify independently. But the Ukrainian interpretation transforms the opponent's potential fear into a political resource.

Ukraine's interpretation of Trump's statement is built on simple logic — if Moscow is afraid, then the weapon works even before delivery. The Hill notes that the Tomahawk discussion coincided with a Ukrainian delegation's visit to Washington, turning the potential delivery into a bargaining element.

Zelensky promised to use any American missiles only against military targets, adding a layer of legitimacy and attempting to alleviate allies' escalation concerns. This is an important political gesture — Kyiv shows readiness to play by the rules, even if the rules are written on the fly. But promises are one thing, and controlling Rules of Engagement compliance on the battlefield is quite another.

Logistics vs. Rhetoric: Without Typhon, Tomahawk Won't Fly

But politics crashes against reality when it comes to launch platforms. Ukraine possesses not a single platform capable of launching Tomahawks. Not one. This isn't a technical nuance — it's a fundamental barrier between threat and its realization.

Tomahawk is a sea-based cruise missile. Its standard carriers are US Navy ships and submarines with Mk 41 vertical launch systems. The only known ground-based platform is the Typhon Mid-Range Capability (MRC) system, a relatively new US Army development. And here's where the problem begins: Typhon exists in extremely limited quantities, deploys slowly, and at this point there are no public confirmations of its transfer to Ukraine. The US Army itself is only beginning deployment, and giving away strategic systems to allies when its own needs aren't covered is rare in American military practice. New developments, such as X-MAV from Oshkosh Defense, show potential alternatives, but these systems are in early demonstration stages and far from serial production.

Are "improvisations" possible? Theoretically — yes. Could one install Mk 41 on a truck or railway platform, as was done with Soviet systems? Hypothetically — possibly. But such solutions remain untested hypotheses without confirmed programs or public contracts.

Logistics defeats rhetoric here. Even if Trump tomorrow signs an order to transfer a thousand Tomahawks, without carriers they'll turn into expensive scrap metal in Ukrainian warehouses.

Missile Shortage and Allied Queue

Even if carriers existed, a question remains: where to get the missiles themselves? The cost of one Tomahawk Block V is about $2 million — this isn't a toy, but a serious investment. And it's not just about price, but shortage.

The nominal production rate at full deployment is about 38 missiles per month, according to NAVAIR data for a multi-year contract. That's approximately 450 per year under ideal conditions. However, actual production in recent years has varied greatly, dropping to as low as 5 missiles per month, which calls into question industry's ability to rapidly scale up. The question: how many of these is the US prepared to give Ukraine, considering its own needs?

Defense Express states directly: deliveries to Ukraine are complicated by limited availability, reserved as a priority for US Navy needs. This isn't a political decision — it's inventory mathematics.

But there's another problem — the allied queue. The US approved the sale of 400 Tomahawks to Japan as part of a $2.35 billion package. This is a confirmed deal, contract, obligations. Japan is a key ally in the Indo-Pacific region, where tensions around Taiwan are growing.

Europe is also getting in line. Germany is considering purchasing Typhon as a "bridge" solution for the next 7–10 years, until Europe develops its own long-range systems. If Berlin starts receiving Typhon, this will further reduce resources available for Ukraine.

Legal Barriers: MTCR and New US Flexibility

But even if missiles and carriers were available in abundance, a legal labyrinth remains. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) establishes a "strong presumption of denial" for exports of Category I systems — which includes cruise missiles like Tomahawk.

Presumption of denial doesn't mean absolute ban, but means each export requires serious political justification and exceptional circumstances. The US has exported Tomahawks to Britain — but this is a special relationship and NATO member with decades of military cooperation.

However, policy doesn't stand still. In March 2025, it was published that the Biden administration softened export rules for "certain partners." The wording is deliberately vague — who exactly are these partners? Under what conditions?

Decisions on Ukraine remain political and bilateral. This isn't a question of engineering or logistics — it's a question of whether the US and its allies are ready to accept risks associated with setting a new precedent.

NATO and European "Bridge" Logic

Parallel to American debates, NATO is building its own position. Secretary General Mark Rutte stated in Davos: "We must change the trajectory of the war... strengthen support for Ukraine." This isn't a directive for immediate Tomahawk deliveries, but it's a political signal — the alliance is ready to consider bolder steps.

The North Atlantic Council discussed with allies US approaches to ending the war. Coordination is ongoing, but consensus isn't the same as unanimity. Eastern European NATO members tend to support more aggressive arming of Ukraine. Germany, France, Italy — more cautious.

Europe faces its own problem: shortage of long-range capabilities. Hence the interest in Typhon as a "bridge" solution. Germany submitted an official request to purchase Typhon through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process.

The "bridge" logic is clear: buy American now, develop European later. But this logic works against Ukraine — every Typhon battery sent to Germany, Poland, or other NATO countries reduces Kyiv's chances of getting its own.

Moscow's Response: "New Level of Escalation" or Familiar Refrain?

Moscow reacts predictably. Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia is "analyzing" the possibility of transferring Tomahawks to Ukraine. This is a cautious formulation — not an ultimatum, not a threat of immediate response, but "analyzing."

But behind the scenes, rhetoric is harsher. Newsweek cites official warnings about a "new level of escalation." This is a familiar narrative — every time the West prepares to take the next step, Moscow declares it "unacceptable."

But here's the paradox: Atlantic Council analyst Peter Dickinson notes that "Russian 'red lines' have repeatedly failed to lead to stated responses." HIMARS was a "red line" — passed. Abrams tanks — same. F-16s — likewise.

Does this mean Moscow is bluffing? Not necessarily. Rather, the Kremlin uses escalation rhetoric as a deterrence tool, without bringing threats to automatic execution. However, Tomahawk qualitatively differs from previous systems — greater range, prestige, Category I MTCR status — and the assumption that Russia will respond identically may reflect normalcy bias. The historical pattern of unfulfilled red lines doesn't prove the next line will also be crossed without consequences.

Three Scenarios: Bluff, Conditional Delivery, Escalatory Deadlock

Let's compile the facts into analytical variants.

Scenario 1: Bluff/Signal (Probability: 60-70%) — Trump never intended to actually supply Tomahawks to Ukraine. The statement was a pressure instrument on Moscow, a way to give Kyiv a political trump card and demonstrate to allies US readiness to go further. The threat works precisely because it remains a threat. Actual delivery would destroy the magic of uncertainty.

Scenario 2: Conditional Delivery (Probability: 25-35%) — The US is genuinely prepared to transfer a limited number of Tomahawks, but only under strict conditions. Ukraine receives or leases Typhon batteries. NATO gives the green light. Kyiv signs strict Rules of Engagement. Missiles are delivered in small batches — dozens, not hundreds. This is a compromise between rhetoric and reality, but with a long time horizon.

Scenario 3: Deadlock (Probability: 15-25%) — Discussion stalls at the stage of coordination among allies. Germany and France block political decisions in NATO. The US cannot allocate Typhon, as its own army hasn't completed deployment. Inventory constraints and Navy priorities defeat political declarations. Result — Trump's statement remains in archives as a "considered but not implemented" option.

Which scenario will materialize? This depends on variables difficult to predict. Uncertainty isn't a sign of analytical weakness, but recognition of reality's complexity.

Conclusion: Signal Already Works, Delivery — In Question

Trump's statement "I might send them Tomahawks" already works as a pressure instrument, even if not a single missile ever leaves the American arsenal. This is the political reality of modern warfare — words have weight, threats shape strategies, and uncertainty can be more powerful than any weapon.

Transforming signal into delivery runs into a triad of problems: carriers, law, and shortage. Without Typhon, Ukraine won't launch a single Tomahawk. Without MTCR softening, the US risks undermining the nonproliferation regime. Without increased production, the US Navy and allies compete for limited resources.

But even without actual delivery, the signal already changes calculations. Moscow is forced to plan defense against long-range capabilities. Kyiv gains an argument in negotiations. Europe accelerates its own programs. NATO strengthens coordination.

The key question remains parties' readiness for dialogue amid growing tensions. Tomahawk isn't just a missile. It's a test of how far the West is willing to go, how credible Russian "red lines" are, and whether NATO unity will persist in the face of real risks.

Worth tracking decisions on Typhon — will new batteries appear, who will receive them. It makes sense to check DSCA notifications on military sales — if the US approves Tomahawk exports to new countries, it's a signal of willingness to blur restrictions. It would be good to monitor MTCR practice adjustments. And most importantly — observe allies' actual willingness to share scarce ammunition.

For now, Tomahawk remains what it initially was — a threat. Effective, frightening, politically advantageous. But a threat. Whether it will transform into reality — time will tell. And time in geopolitics is always the most expensive and unpredictable resource.