Association without power: why the dispute over the SZO between Serbia and Kosovo is a dispute about text and subtext

Brussels, June 2025. Serbia’s chief negotiator, Petar Petković, met with the EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák to discuss the status and prospects for implementing the normalization agreement between Belgrade and Pristina. The central question has once again become the establishment of the Community of Serb Municipalities (CSM), provided for by a series of agreements dating back to the Brussels Document of 2013. This is reported by the Italian agency ANSA.

Serbia insists that the CSM must have executive powers enabling it to directly manage healthcare, education, and urban development in municipalities with a Serb majority. As Petković emphasized in several statements, including an interview with Sputnik Serbia, Belgrade does not agree to a model of “an NGO with limited functions.”

Kosovo, for its part, points out that none of the previously signed agreements—neither the Brussels (2013) nor the Implementation Addendum (2015), nor the Ohrid Plan (2023)—envisages the creation of a structure with independent executive authority. All documents emphasize that any CSM functions must be carried out in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Kosovo and may be expanded only by decision of the central authorities. Thus, the agreements do indeed refer to a “full overview” in certain spheres, but this is interpreted as coordination and representative functions—not as autonomous policy implementation outside the state system.

It is precisely this discrepancy—between what is desired and what is permissible—that has become the principal obstacle to realizing the idea of the CSM. Kosovo views it as an instrument of municipal self-government within the existing state framework, whereas Belgrade seeks to turn the structure into a de facto autonomous body comparable to the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⸻

What the 2013 and 2015 Agreements Actually Provide

The creation of the Community of Serb Municipalities (CSM) was first formalized under the Brussels Agreement, signed on 19 April 2013. This document, concluded under the mediation of the European Union, became one of the key stages in normalizing relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Its text is available via the archive.

2013: The “full overview” Formula

According to paragraphs 1–6 of the Agreement:

• The CSM is to be established as a form of association of municipalities with a Serb majority;

• It shall be founded on a statute agreed by the parties;

• It is envisaged that the CSM will operate within the law of Kosovo and the European Charter of Local Self-Government;

• The term “full overview” is introduced in the areas of:

• economic development,

• education,

• healthcare,

• urban and rural planning.

However, the term “full overview” is not accompanied by a precise definition of the scope of authority. It leaves room for interpretation, but the text goes on to clarify that:

“The Association/Community may also exercise additional powers delegated by central governmental authorities” (paragraph 5).

Thus, any expanded powers must be provided by agreement with the Kosovo government, rather than arising automatically.

Moreover, the Agreement emphasizes:

• the unified status of the Kosovo Police;

• the inclusion of Serb officers in the general Kosovo police system;

• a special judicial panel in the Court of Appeals in Pristina;

• the holding of elections in northern municipalities according to the laws of the Republic of Kosovo.

These provisions exclude the creation of a parallel executive hierarchy and underscore the integrative nature of the model, despite recognizing the cultural and administrative specificity of the Serb population.

2015: Expansion, but Within the Law

On 25 August 2015, the parties agreed on the “Basic Elements of the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities,” which describe in greater detail the organizational structure and objectives of the CSM. The document is available in the official EEAS repository.

The text states that:

• The CSM is to be established in accordance with the First Agreement (2013) and the legislation of Kosovo;

• Its bodies (assembly, president, board, administration) will be formed from representatives of elected municipal authorities;

• The administrative staff are subject to the Kosovo Law on Civil Service;

• All actions must be carried out in accordance with the Labor Law and other Kosovo legal acts.

The CSM acquires legal personality to:

• own property,

• conclude contracts,

• receive financing—including from Serbia.

However, it is again confirmed that all powers are subject to control, regulation, and possible delegation by central authorities of Kosovo.

Thus, the 2013 and 2015 Agreements create a hybrid model that:

• grants the CSM broad consultative and coordinating functions;

• but does not contain a legal mechanism for establishing an independent executive authority operating outside the system of the Republic of Kosovo.

⸻

Serbia’s Position: “No NGOs” and the Demand for Powers

Since the signing of the Brussels Agreement in 2013, Serbian officials have consistently emphasized that the CSM must not be just a consultative body but a structure with real powers. In particular, this position has been actively promoted in recent years—both in public statements and during EU-facilitated negotiations.

In November 2023, the Director of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija, Petar Petković, stated outright that Belgrade does not agree to transforming the CSM into a non-governmental organization. In an interview with Sputnik Serbia, he emphasized:

“Discussions about the status of the CSM must provide answers to how the important issues concerning the CSM will be resolved—first and foremost, how the executive powers that the CSM has in accordance with the agreements signed in 2013 and 2015 will be handled.”

Earlier, in January 2023, Petković made a similar statement on Radio-Television of Serbia (RTS), stressing that any attempts “to reduce the CSM to an NGO” contradict the spirit of the agreements:

“It is clear that here we are talking about yet another attempt to present the CSM as a kind of non-governmental organization with significantly fewer powers than those agreed upon in the agreements, which clearly stipulate that the CSM will have executive powers to protect the collective rights of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija.”

These formulations demonstrate Belgrade’s key emphasis: not merely on the spheres of activity (education, healthcare, planning), but specifically on the form of governance. Serbia interprets “full overview” as the right to self-govern these spheres—without coordination with Pristina. This position implies the existence of its own executive structures, including control over finances, personnel, infrastructure, and regulatory processes.

In practice, this means an attempt to create a structure operating outside the jurisdiction of Kosovo’s central authorities—which alarms Pristina, Brussels, and several EU member states, fearful of a repeat of the Republika Srpska model from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⸻

The Ohrid Agreement 2023: A Compromise without Sovereignty

In March 2023, Kosovo and Serbia, under EU mediation, agreed on the so-called Ohrid Agreement—formally titled Agreement on the Path to Normalization between Kosovo and Serbia. Its text is published on the European External Action Service (EEAS) website.

The document contains eleven articles aimed at mutual recognition of symbols, institutions, and norms of state functioning. The central interest in the context of the CSM dispute is Article 7, which reads:

“Both Parties commit to establish specific arrangements and guarantees, in accordance with relevant previous agreements (including the Agreement on Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities), to ensure an appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo.”

Key elements of this phrasing:

1. Recognition of previous agreements (including the 2013 and 2015 documents);

2. The commitment to create mechanisms and guarantees for implementing those agreements;

3. Use of the term “appropriate level of self-management,” rather than “executive authority” or “autonomous governance.”

Consequently, the Agreement does not introduce new legal grounds for expanded autonomy for the Serb community, but merely confirms the necessity of fulfilling prior commitments within the previously defined framework.

Appendix to the Agreement: Urgent Steps—Without Specification of Powers

On 18 March 2023, an Appendix to the Agreement was agreed, also published by EEAS. It specifies the procedure for implementing the Agreement, including paragraph 5:

“To implement Article 7, Kosovo will immediately launch negotiations within the EU-facilitated Dialogue on the establishment of specific arrangements and guarantees to ensure an appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo.”

This means:

• Kosovo is obliged to begin negotiations on the form of implementing the promised level of self-management;

• but the scope and nature of these powers remain subject to discussion, and nowhere is the transfer of executive authority mentioned;

• the text explicitly states that the Agreement does not permit blocking any part of it (Article 10), but also emphasizes that any evasion from implementation will have consequences within the context of European integration (Article 12).

Thus, the Ohrid Agreement 2023 does not grant the CSM new powers, but returns the question to the existing framework—confirming the obligation to implement it in the spirit of previous agreements. The central formula—“appropriate level of self-management”—leaves room for interpretation, but does not imply the formation of an independent executive hierarchy.

⸻

Kosovo’s Position: Unity of the State System and Constitutional Court Decision

In response to Belgrade’s interpretations, Kosovo authorities insist that the CSM can exist only within the framework of Kosovo’s Constitution and legislation—as a form of inter-municipal cooperation, but not as an autonomous executive structure.

Constitutional Court of Kosovo: 2015 Decision

In December 2015, the Constitutional Court of Kosovo examined the request concerning the compliance of the “2015 Principles” with the country’s fundamental law. In its decision, the Court recognized the permissibility of establishing the CSM as an association of municipalities but pointed to the inconsistency of certain provisions of the document with the constitutional order.

In particular, the Court ruled that:

• the creation of the CSM is possible only if its Statute does not envisage the transfer of sovereign or executive powers that could conflict with centralized governance;

• provisions allowing the CSM to intervene in education, healthcare, and planning are permissible only within the framework of already delegated municipal functions and cannot create a new level of authority;

• any actions of the CSM must be integrated into the existing legal system, not parallel to it.

The full text of the decision is available in the Constitutional Court of Kosovo’s database: Judgment KO130/15 (Dec 23, 2015).

Thus, even if the text of the 2015 Principles allows a "full overview" in a number of areas, the implementation of these provisions in practice is limited by the constitutional framework that prohibits duplication or creation of alternative authorities.

Executive Branch Position

Prime Minister Albin Kurti and President Vjosa Osmani have repeatedly stated that Kosovo is ready to fulfill its obligations to establish the CSM, but only on the condition of:

• full compliance of the CSM Statute with the Constitution of Kosovo;

• absence of elements that could threaten the unity of state governance;

• a transparent process in which the Association does not duplicate central authorities but merely coordinates municipal interests.

In an article by Euroactiv, President Osmani is quoted:

“I support any initiative that does not contradict Kosovo’s Constitution,” “Municipalities are already permitted to join multi-ethnic associations without executive powers, such as NGOs,”

and “No one is in favor of the Republika Srpska being in Kosovo.”

Thus, Kosovo demonstrates readiness to create the CSM—but exclusively in a format compatible with a unitary state model, without elements of territorial autonomy or institutions operating outside the state vertical.

⸻

Analysis: The CSM Between Law and Politics

The conflict over the CSM is not merely a dispute about a technical statute or models of municipal governance. It is a dispute over the political status of the Serb community in Kosovo and, more broadly, over the very architecture of state sovereignty in the post-Yugoslav space. Serbia seeks to use the CSM as a leverage point; Kosovo views it as a defensive line.

Terminology as an Interpretive Tool

Phrases like “full overview” or “appropriate level of self-management,” contained in the 2013, 2015, and 2023 Agreements, were deliberately left vague. This allowed the parties to sign documents without relinquishing their positions.

• For Serbia: these terms are an opportunity to advance a model of “broad autonomy” up to executive independence;

• For Kosovo: the same text means inter-municipal coordination within the constitution.

Why the Comparison to Republika Srpska Frightens Pristina

Belgrade’s arguments, which appeal to the CSM’s right to act independently in healthcare, education, and planning, refer to the practice of Republika Srpska—one of the two constituent entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That structure possesses its own legislative, judicial, and executive powers, including its own police and budget.

For Pristina and many Western capitals, such an analogy is unacceptable:

• it contradicts the 2015 decision of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo;

• it effectively signifies territorially based, ethnically defined decentralization, which undermines sovereignty.

What Next?

Despite the intensification of dialogue in 2023–2025, the legal contradiction remains unresolved. And the issue is not only about agreeing on the CSM Statute, but about a conceptual divergence:

Position

Legal model: Kosovo - unitary state with local coordination, Serbia -

Territorial autonomy.

Position

Statute of the SZO: Kosovo - is consistent with the Constitution, Serbia - is treated as a separate competence.

Position

Powers: Kosovo - delegated by the central government, Serbia - must be internally inherent.

Possible Scenarios:

1. A compromise statute agreed under EU pressure—but with minimal powers;

2. A stalemate in which the CSM is legally approved but not implemented in practice;

3. Escalation, if one side unilaterally withdraws from negotiations or attempts to implement the CSM in contravention of the conditions.

⸻

Conclusion

The question of what status the Community of Serb Municipalities should receive is more than a debate about municipal policy. It is a test of the limits of possible compromise between two sides that for decades have not recognized each other’s legitimacy. And as long as the text of the Agreements leaves room for dual interpretation, a real resolution of the conflict will require either political courage or external pressure.