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Kremlin confirms Istanbul talks, EU launches 17th sanctions package

5/14/25

By:

Michael K.

The sanctions target the “shadow fleet” and logistical schemes to circumvent the embargo, creating a strong incentive for Moscow to sit down at the negotiating table.

War Russia Ukraine negotiations Trump USA Türkiye

On May 14, the Kremlin officially confirmed that the scheduled peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul on May 15 “are still planned,” while refusing to disclose the composition of the delegation (Reuters). 


Meanwhile, the European Union approved its 17th sanctions package against Moscow, set to take effect on May 20 and aimed primarily at the “shadow fleet” of 200 oil tankers and a network for circumventing the embargo (RFE/RL). A strike against key logistical schemes and the threat of new asset freezes create a serious incentive for the Kremlin to participate in the talks – even despite internal disagreements in the EU and uncertainty regarding the attendance of leaders in Istanbul.


In this article, we will trace the background of the Istanbul talks, assess the role of the US and Trump, consider the European sanctions factor, and analyze how the “crossfire” between Brussels and Moscow affects Serbia’s position. Then – possible scenarios for developments at the May 15–16 summit.


Background of the talks


The last direct peace talks between Russia and Ukraine took place in March 2022. The sides first met in Belarus on February 28, then moved to videoconferences, and on March 29, 2022, the talks were held in person in Istanbul at the Topkapı Palace (What happened the last time Russia and Ukraine held peace talks?). Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu later described these meetings as the “most significant progress” since the start of the war.


The foundation of the 2022 Istanbul round was the so-called “Istanbul communique” – a draft agreement under which Ukraine would commit to permanent neutrality, forgo NATO membership and nuclear weapons, in exchange for international security guarantees from the five permanent UN Security Council members and the EU. Ukraine could also look forward to the prospect of EU accession. The main sticking points were the wording of the guarantees, the status of the Russian language, and Moscow’s demand that Ukraine repeal its “de-Nazification” laws.


However, by mid-April 2022, the talks stalled when Ukrainian forces achieved a series of tactical victories and Russian war crimes became more widely known. The document was effectively not ratified, and Kyiv officially stated that no consensus was reached on the key points. Today, the Kremlin refers to this 2022 draft as “the basis for new negotiations,” offering the US and Ukraine a return to the “Istanbul draft.”


Role of the US and statements by Trump


US President Donald Trump said on Wednesday he remains open to participating in the Istanbul talks, provided that Vladimir Putin attends in person. “I’d like to be there… I don’t know if he [Putin] will come if I’m not there. We’ll see,” Trump said aboard Air Force One en route to Qatar (Reuters).


He also emphasized that he is ready to participate “if it helps save lives” and would consider joining in a “leader-to-leader” format, adding extra political weight to the summit.


Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and senior special envoys Steve Witkoff and Keith Kellogg have already headed to Istanbul to prepare for the meeting, ensuring an American presence at the talks even without the former president’s participation.


Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has made his participation conditional on Putin’s personal presence, stating that “the decision to end the war… can only be made by Putin” (Reuters).


The European factor


French President Emmanuel Macron confirmed that Paris will push for additional sanctions against Russia if the Kremlin rejects a 30-day ceasefire proposal. In his words, this involves expanding restrictions on the financial and energy sectors, specifically banning the import of Russian coal and oil via third countries and freezing assets of key banking structures (Reuters).


German Chancellor Friedrich Merz told the Bundestag that “Western unity is the key to success” and urged all EU members to support a package of “sectoral sanctions,” including restrictions on the export of technology for Russia’s gas and nuclear sectors (Reuters). He also noted that the package is smaller in scale than previous measures but that the “strike against the shadow fleet” will have a tangible economic effect.


Despite broad agreement, some member states (notably Hungary and Slovakia) have expressed doubts about the need for tighter sanctions amidst rising energy prices in Europe. Diplomats point out that without a united front and coordination with the US, any threats of “new sanctions” may remain mere declarations (Politico Europe).


Nevertheless, the approved 17th package, taking effect on May 20, combines a clear “strike against the shadow fleet”—blocking about 200 oil tankers and embargo-evading networks—with targeted pressure on energy companies and banks. This adds an extra lever of pressure on the Kremlin and increases the chances of Russia participating in the Istanbul talks, as further delays risk serious disruptions to hydrocarbon export revenues.


Geopolitical context for Serbia


Belgrade finds itself in a “crossfire” between Brussels and Moscow. In the EU’s 17th sanctions package, effective May 20, Serbian companies suspected of supplying resources for the Russian military are explicitly mentioned (RFE/RL).


The official position of the Serbian authorities remains cautious—Belgrade has not publicly declared either support for or condemnation of the Istanbul talks. In the latest “Monday Briefing from the Balkans” on May 5, Balkan Insight did not mention this topic at all, indicating its low priority for local media (Balkan Insight).


Analysts note that Serbia is balancing between its aspirations for EU integration and traditional political and energy ties with Moscow. On the one hand, involvement in the “shadow fleet” bypass schemes could cost Belgrade access to EU investments and credit, risks heightened after asset freezes on several Serbian companies. On the other hand, a sharp break with Moscow could cool relations with a key partner on security and energy.


As a result, Serbia is forced to maintain neutrality: neither openly supporting nor directly condemning the Russia-Ukraine talks in Turkey, hoping not to lose either European markets or Russian supply channels.


Possible scenarios for developments


1. Putin participates without Trump → diplomatic victory for the Kremlin


If Vladimir Putin attends in Istanbul while Donald Trump ultimately skips the summit, Russia will be able to claim leadership of the peace process. This will allow Moscow to dictate the terms of further talks, and the US and EU will have to make concessions to avoid losing control over the format.


2. “Leader-to-leader” format: Trump and Putin together


Joint participation by Trump and Putin under a “leader-to-leader” banner will send a strong political signal and increase the chances of at least a partial agreement on a 30-day ceasefire. Any collapse of the agreement in this format will result in unprecedented sanctions on Russia and political losses for the US.


3. Both sides refuse → pressure through sanctions intensifies


If the talks fail because one side refuses, the EU’s 17th sanctions package blocking the “shadow fleet” and new restrictions on energy and banking structures will come into force on May 20. 

Simultaneously, the US may introduce additional measures, including a ban on Russian oil imports and a technology embargo.


4. “The Serbian question” remains in the background


Regardless of the outcome of the Istanbul meeting, Serbia will maintain a wait-and-see stance: the effort against the “shadow fleet” will weaken Serbian bypass schemes, but Belgrade still risks losing credibility with both the EU and Moscow. Meanwhile, the absence of a clear public position leaves Serbia without leverage over the course of the talks.


5. Unexpected twist: summit postponement


Due to internal EU pressures (Hungary and Slovakia refusing the sanctions) or the unpredictable political schedules of Putin and Trump, the meeting could be postponed to a later date. In that case, all parties will have additional time for precise preparation and format coordination—but risk facing even tougher sanctions and growing fatigue of the international community over the protracted conflict.

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