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US Multipolar Diplomacy: From Tough Sanctions to Humanitarian Crisis

6/4/25

By:

Michael K.

June 3–4, 2025 – new measures against Russia, escalation of trade confrontations with China, strengthening of cooperation with Taiwan and worsening of the situation in Gaza.

USA Mercedes China Taiwan European Union

On 3 June 2025, U.S. foreign-policy activity took on an especially intense and multifaceted character: from harsh sanctions against Russia and diplomatic maneuvers with allies to the escalation of a trade confrontation with China and the deepening of military cooperation with Taiwan. Simultaneously, in the Middle East, attention to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza increased, along with the development of controversial initiatives related to the Gaza Strip.


1. Harsh Sanctions against Russia: a New Amplitude of Pressure


On 3 June, Senator Lindsey Graham officially introduced the “Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025”, which provides for punitive tariffs of up to 500 % on goods from countries that continue to trade actively with Moscow (in particular, China and India). Such measures are intended to completely cut off alternative funding channels for the Russian regime. The bill has stalled in large part due to the vacillations of former President Trump, who initially reacted skeptically to the idea of even stricter restrictions but in recent weeks has begun to play up the topic of the Ukrainian conflict, giving Graham hope for agreement on key provisions.


Graham is actively coordinating his position with European partners: simultaneously, he held negotiations in Kyiv and Brussels, pushing for a united front against possible loopholes that Moscow might use to bypass Western sanctions. According to the senator, the toughening of tariffs should become “the last tool to show that the price of supporting Russia’s war increases exponentially.”


2. Reduction of U.S. Presence in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group


For the first time since the creation of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in 2022, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegset did not participate in its meeting in Brussels—neither in person nor virtually. Instead, the United States was represented by European Command Commander General Christopher Cavoli. This was reported in detail by AP News.


Pentagon officials justified Hegset’s absence by citing a need to focus on broader strategic tasks, including countering China. Nevertheless, allies expressed serious concern: French President Emmanuel Macron directly warned that “any reduction of American presence in the coordination of assistance to Kyiv potentially undermines trust in the U.S. as a reliable partner.”


In Brussels, it was noted that Cavoli is well informed about the situation on the front, but it was precisely the absence of the Secretary of Defense that was perceived by a number of European ministers as a sign that Washington might shift its priorities from the Ukrainian crisis to the Indo-Pacific region.


3. Visit of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz to Washington


According to Reuters, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz will arrive in Washington on Thursday, 5 June 2025, for a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. During the talks, the parties intend to discuss trade tariffs (in particular, the threat of the U.S. imposing a 50 % tariff on cars and other industrial goods from the EU), the situation in the Russia–Ukraine conflict, and Middle East issues. The German side expresses concern that excessive tariffs may push the EU to draw closer to China, while the United States seeks to maintain “an advantage” in strategically important industries.


4. New Tariffs on Chinese Steel and an Upcoming Trump–Xi Jinping Conversation


Immediately after Merz’s visit, a statement was published on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s website announcing a 50 % tariff on Chinese steel. This decision followed a conclusion that Beijing is excessively subsidizing metallurgical giants, artificially lowering prices on the world market. In response, Chinese media expressed regret but stressed that “Beijing is ready to defend the interests of the national business.”


Concurrently, information emerged that Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping plan to hold a telephone conversation “in the coming days” to stabilize trade channels. Sources at Reuters note that the White House hopes to use the negotiations to soften the tense atmosphere, although there remains the possibility of further measures aimed at protecting the United States’ strategically important industries.


5. Taiwan and Washington: “Close Information Exchange” on Tariffs


Taiwan has not remained on the sidelines and, according to Reuters, is conducting a “close exchange of information” with the U.S. administration on the issue of import and export tariffs. Initially, Washington planned to impose a 32 % tariff on most Taiwanese goods (excluding semiconductors) by 1 April 2025, but Trump at the last moment extended the pause by another six months, giving Taipei time for negotiations.


Taiwanese representatives note that “frank and constructive” discussions are underway, although details remain secret. The Taiwanese side is confident that it can negotiate mutually beneficial conditions, since the island’s economy directly depends on the export of high-tech components and the United States is interested in stable semiconductor supply chains.


6. Shangri-La Dialogue: China as an “Inevitable Threat”


At the annual regional Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegset warned allies of the “inevitable” threat from China. According to Hegset, Beijing is not only expanding its armaments but is in fact preparing for a possible attempt to annex Taiwan. This statement heightens tension, as Europe and Australia have already expressed concern about the reallocation of resources—fearing that against the backdrop of the growing threat in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States may “redirect” attention and funding from NATO’s sphere of responsibility. Information about Hegset’s speech was published by AP News.


Australian colleagues in the dialogue corridors approve of the increased level of military support for Taiwan but criticize the “aggressive tariffs” that destabilize the regional economy. Analysts note that in this context, American policy takes on an ever more multidimensional character: on the one hand, the U.S. is intensifying military pressure on China; on the other, it is imposing trade sanctions that affect not only Beijing but also China’s close partners.


7. New Arms Contracts for Taiwan


A practical consequence of the course to strengthen Taiwan’s defense has been negotiations on new contracts. According to Reuters, over the next four years the United States plans to conclude deals exceeding $18.3 billion (the sales volume during Trump’s first term). The main focus will be on missile systems, ammunition, and drones. This move is aimed at strengthening Taiwan’s defensive potential in the face of mounting pressure from the PRC. As early as last month, Trump repeatedly emphasized that “Taiwan must have the means for self-defense,” and this position finds support both in the Pentagon and among a number of congressmen from both parties.


8. The Memory of Tiananmen as a Strategic Message


On 3 June, the world marked the 36th anniversary of the events in Tiananmen Square. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and a U.S. State Department representative issued a joint statement, emphasizing that Beijing’s “minimization” of the consequences of those events will not allow one to forget the victims or undermine the aspiration for democracy.


As Reuters reports, Washington and Taipei called on the international community to remain vigilant and prevent a repeat of repression against peaceful protesters. For China, this memory remains a painful reminder of the unaccepted alternative to one-party control, and the American and Taiwanese statements on the anniversary served as a kind of signal of internal solidarity among democratic forces in the Asian region.


9. Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza: Tragedy at a Food Distribution Point


Twenty-seven people were killed and dozens were wounded near a food distribution point in Rafah organized by the U.S. – Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF). 


According to Time, people were lining up for food when Israeli soldiers opened fire, presumably because some had deviated from designated routes. The United Nations demanded an independent investigation of the incident, and human-rights advocates spoke of possible war crimes.


Just two days later, on 4 June, at a meeting of the UN Security Council a resolution on an unconditional ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the release of all hostages was to be discussed. As Reuters notes, the draft resolution has already been supported by ten nonpermanent members, but it runs the risk of being vetoed by one of the five permanent members. This situation illustrates how difficult it is to achieve consensus even on the most humanitarian issues.


10. GHF: Trust Crisis and Leadership Change


In the midst of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, the U.S. – Gaza Humanitarian Foundation faced both internal and external problems. On 3 June it became known that GHF had appointed Rev. Dr. Johnnie Moore, a well-known evangelical leader and former Trump adviser, as chairman. This appointment was criticized by the UN and major NGOs, which accused GHF of “militarizing” humanitarian aid.


Moreover, Boston Consulting Group announced the suspension of its participation in the project and the withdrawal of its team from Tel Aviv. BCG employees protested allegations that their work “complicates and delays” the delivery of aid, and GHF has come under pressure from human-rights advocates demanding greater transparency in the allocation of funds and resources.


At the same time, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that intentionally restricting access to food for Gaza’s civilians “may qualify as a war crime,” condemning systematic attacks near humanitarian points. These statements underscore the acuteness of the problem: delivering food into Gaza and ensuring its safety have become issues not only of charity but also of international law.


11. Trump’s Controversial Plan to “Acquire” the Gaza Strip


As early as February 2025, Donald Trump proposed a concept to “take control” of the entire Gaza Strip, turning it into a “Riviera of the Middle East.” According to his plan, over 2 million Palestinians would have to be deported and hundreds of millions of tons of rubble cleared. This plan provoked harsh criticism from the UN and a number of countries, which called it a violation of international law and “a collective crime.” Despite attempts by some administration members to soften the formulation, Trump insisted that “the Gaza Strip will belong to the United States.” Details are available in a Reuters report.


The reaction of the world community was uncompromising: many countries declared that they would not recognize such territorial-political claims. As a result, by the summer of 2025 the topic of “acquiring” Gaza had virtually disappeared, but it became a serious reputational blow to Trump as an international actor.


12. Call to Bar Trump from Participating in the G7 Summit


Simultaneously with the flare-ups in the Middle East and European debates, Genocide Watch sent an open letter to the Prime Minister of Canada, calling on him not to allow Donald Trump to participate in the G7 summit (15–17 June 2025 in Canmore, Alberta). Activists argue that Trump’s policies “undermine the values of cooperation and democracy,” and that his trade wars and approval of Russian aggression against Ukraine “threaten the security of allies.” Genocide Watch insists that Canada should use the G7 platform to demonstrate its rejection of U.S. support for the Kremlin during this period.


Conclusion: A Multipolar Landscape of American Diplomacy


A summary of the key events of 3–4 June 2025 shows that the United States is acting simultaneously on multiple fronts:


1. Sanctions policy: Senator Lindsey Graham’s new bill lays the foundation for maximum economic pressure on Russia, demonstrating Congress’s firm readiness to toughen its stance.


2. Military assistance to Ukraine: the reduction of the Defense Secretary’s personal participation in the Contact Group clearly indicates a reprioritization that causes concern among European allies.


3. Trade negotiations with the EU and China: first, Chancellor Merz’s visit to Washington; second, new steel tariffs and Trump’s upcoming conversation with Xi Jinping. This signals a desire to reorient policy toward protecting national industry.


4. Relations with Taiwan: both in trade and military dimensions, the U.S. supports close dialogue on tariffs and expands arms sales.


5. Humanitarian risks in the Middle East: the tragedy in Rafah, controversial appointments at GHF, BCG’s withdrawal, and UN statements on potential war crimes underscore the complexity not only of political but also of legal dimensions of the Gaza events.


6. Trump’s scandalous initiatives: from the proposal to “acquire” Gaza to Genocide Watch’s appeal to bar him from the G7—these developments damage the U.S. image internationally and create new “red flags” for allies.


Taken together, these events show that American diplomacy and security on 3–4 June 2025 are undergoing dynamic restructuring: hardness toward Russia, growing worry about Ukraine’s future, trade disputes with China, strengthening ties with Taiwan, and contradictory actions in the Middle East. Washington faces the task of maintaining unity of the Western camp—from Europe to Asia—while responding to multifaceted challenges arising simultaneously in different regions of the world.

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