Justice Without Trial: China Offers the World a Compromise on Concepts

China is offering the world justice without trial. On May 30, 2025, the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed) was launched in Hong Kong, intended as an alternative to existing frameworks for resolving international disputes. Instead of norms and verdicts — compromise and consultations. Instead of The Hague — Hong Kong. Instead of law — political agreements. The organization brings together 32 countries, mostly from the Global South and post-socialist regimes. Its headquarters will also be located in Hong Kong, with operations scheduled to begin by the end of the year (AP).

According to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the organization's goal is to "promote peaceful dispute resolution based on equality, consultation, and dialogue," without coercion or pressure typical of Western models of justice (Reuters). 

This statement comes amid growing criticism of the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose legitimacy is being undermined by a series of high-profile political incidents.

Crisis of Confidence in the International Criminal Court

Over the past two years, the ICC has been at the center of international scandals.

In November 2024, the Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, accusing them of war crimes in Gaza (ICC). In response, Hungary announced its withdrawal from ICC jurisdiction, demonstrating a rift within the EU on issues of international justice (WSJ).

At the same time, the ICC continued its proceedings against Russia: the arrest warrant for President Vladimir Putin, issued in March 2023 for the deportation of Ukrainian children, remains in force ICC). However, Russia ignores the Court’s jurisdiction, undermining its ability to enforce decisions.

A further blow to the ICC's reputation came from U.S. policy. In February 2025, the Trump administration reimposed sanctions on Court personnel, accusing them of "illegitimate investigations against American allies" (HRW). These moves reinforced accusations that the ICC is selective and politically motivated.

In March 2025, the European Commission issued a statement defending the ICC as an "irreplaceable element of the international justice architecture," but refrained from sanctioning Hungary, offering only political criticism (Euronews).

China's Alternative: Strategy and Positioning

China, not a party to the ICC (list of non-member states), has long criticized it as a tool of Western pressure. In response to the trust crisis, Beijing is promoting its own model — not based on legal jurisdiction, but on mediation mechanisms. This allows China to strengthen its position in Asia, Africa, and Latin America by offering an alternative that does not imply interference in internal affairs. In practice, this means a shift from universal law to customized political arrangements — justice on agreed terms, where there are no defendants, only negotiators.

The International Organization for Mediation will not have the power to issue binding decisions or prosecute criminals. However, it may become a platform for legitimizing China’s approach to international conflicts and expanding its diplomatic influence.

Mediation Versus Criminal Jurisdiction: Law and Compromise

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is based on international humanitarian and criminal law. Its task is to determine responsibility for grave crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, regardless of political context or negotiation processes. It is a legal institution based on norms applicable to all and enforces punishment if guilt is proven.

In contrast, the Chinese model — the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed) — is not based on a legally enshrined concept of guilt and punishment. Its function is to find consensus and preserve diplomatic channels. This is not justice, but an attempt to build a compromise solution without assessing the legality of parties' actions. Such a system can only work where the conflicting parties are willing to negotiate on the principle of "you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours," without rights and obligations in the legal sense. And it is precisely this format that has proven especially attractive to regimes with something to hide. This makes such a system essentially extra-legal, which may have advantages (flexibility, de-escalation) but also significant drawbacks — lack of accountability and sanctions.

Take Libya as an example. In 2011, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Muammar Gaddafi (ICC, official statement on Libya case). This decision legally excluded the possibility of legitimate negotiations, as any diplomat contacting Gaddafi would be dealing with someone subject to arrest. De facto, negotiations continued through private channels, which happened in several instances.

Had the Chinese model been in place, the parties — rebels, Gaddafi representatives, and international actors — could have been invited to multilateral dialogue. However, the question arises: how can the boundaries of the acceptable be defined without recognized law and sanctions? For one party, bombing a city may be considered a "military necessity," for another — a crime against humanity. Without a legal framework, all actions are distorted through the prism of political interpretation.

Thus, the question remains open: can a mediation model prevent crimes against humanity without enforcement mechanisms and without norms defining the limits of acceptability? Or will a compromise based on balancing interests always fall victim to subjectivity, where there are no rights, only deals?

Reaction of the International Community

Global South countries welcomed China’s initiative as a step toward a fairer and more inclusive international order (AP). At the same time, Western analysts express concern that the new body could displace institutions based on international law (Spotlight).

Critics argue that the lack of enforcement mechanisms makes IOMed weak in matters of accountability for war crimes. However, proponents claim that in the face of a loss of trust in the ICC and the absence of universal jurisdiction, mediation may be a more realistic tool of influence.

Consequences: A Transformation of the Architecture of International Justice?

The creation of IOMed reflects a shift in the global balance of power: authoritarian and postcolonial regimes are increasingly seeking alternatives to Western legal institutions. China, offering soft power in the form of diplomacy, is gradually reclaiming space left by the ICC’s crisis of confidence.

This initiative does not so much compete with The Hague as it demonstrates that the unipolar model of global justice is no longer seen as the only possible one.

The Chinese project is not just a diplomatic showcase. It is the formation of a new axis, where "law" is what can be agreed upon, not what is codified in norms. Most IOMed member states are autocracies, where the judiciary is an extension of political will. For them, a deal-based compromise is closer than the norms of international law. And if this model takes root, it will not be a transformation but a reboot of justice with someone else’s language and someone else’s rules — where justice ceases to be a right and becomes a negotiation option.

As of late May 2025, the English-language Wikipedia entry under "Members" lists the following countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Belarus, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Laos, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. This list is not yet accompanied by links to official sources but reflects the current public representation of IOMed's membership in the media space.